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PHENOMENAL COSMIC POWERS, ITTY-BITTY LIVING SPACE: 
ERISA-GOVERNED HEALTHCARE PLANS SEEKING “APPROPRIATE 
EQUITABLE RELIEF” AGAINST WORKERS’ COMPENSATION 
SETTLEMENTS 
 
William Baker† 
 
ABSTRACT 
     The Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA) 
safeguards the financial well-being and equitable administration of 
employer-provided benefit plans but also interferes with the ability of 
employees to obtain workers’ compensation benefits in some circumstances. 
The Supreme Court has allowed employers to weaponize ERISA’s remedy 
provisions, giving ERISA plan administrators an unfettered ability to enforce 
the private law of fringe benefit contracts with the power of federal statute. 
     ERISA authorizes a cause of action, enforceable exclusively in federal 
court, for plan administrators to obtain appropriate equitable relief to 
enforce the terms of the plan. One term contained in most employer-
provided health care plans requires a person who has received benefits under 
the plan to reimburse the plan for any benefits paid in the event of any 
recovery from a third party. The Supreme Court has decided four cases where 
a plan sought reimbursement from a plan participant who received a third-
party tort settlement. These decisions gave employers the ability to create 
one-sided plan terms. The employee carries the burden of paying all the costs 
of obtaining a third-party recovery, while ERISA preemption removes any 
state-law obstacles to a plan’s ability to receive full reimbursement. 
     An ERISA plan can seek similarly unencumbered reimbursement from 
workers’ compensation benefits paid by the employer or its insurer. Workers’ 
compensation benefits are calculated to pay just enough to keep an injured 
worker from destitution. But an obligation to reimburse the full amount of 
past medical treatment can prevent an employee from obtaining any real 
relief in the event of a disputed compensation claim. An employee desiring 
health care coverage from an employer is faced with an unforeseeable 
Hobson’s choice: either to forego a chance at obtaining workers’ 
compensation benefits if the entitlement is arguable or to reject the adhesion 
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contract of the employer’s health plan and forego any premium-sharing 
fringe benefit. 
     This result cannot be what Congress intended when enacting ERISA in 
order to protect employee benefits. The Supreme Court’s jurisprudence on 
“appropriate equitable relief” under ERISA has little equity in it. Granting 
equitable relief to an employer-funded health plan must account for the full 
bargain between the employee and employer, a bargain that includes the 
obligation of the employer to provide compensation benefits to employees 
injured in the line of duty. The maxims of equity require no less. 
     Equitable relief under ERISA should be tempered by proper contractual 
construction, whether as written or as reformed. Relief could also take the 
form of estoppel: holding an ERISA plan to the terms of a settlement between 
the employee and employer, or to the background of state law that formed 
the basis of the employment relationship. A final option would be Congress 
amending ERISA’s remedies provisions, wiping clean the slate of tortuous 
judicial interpretation, and leveling the playing field under ERISA for 
employers and employees. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
     On September 2, 1974, President Ford signed the Employee Retirement 
Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA) into law. Upon signing, he said, “It is 
certainly appropriate that this law be signed on Labor Day, since this act 
marks a brighter future for almost all the men and women of our labor 
force.”1 The “almost” is somewhat surprising—after all, President Kennedy 
did not say “We choose to go most of the way to the moon”2—but it was also 
prescient. Some of the labor force’s men and women whose futures ERISA 
has not made brighter are injured workers whose compensation claims are 
disputed. 
     In all fifty states, workers’ compensation acts obligate employers to pay 
medical expenses and a portion of lost wages to employees who suffer a work-
related injury or an occupational disease.3 Often, the employer controverts a 
                                                
1.  1 RONALD J. COOKE, ERISA PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 1:1 (October 2018 update) 
(citing Remarks by President Gerald Ford on the Signing of HR 2, (Pub. L. No. 93-406, 88 Stat. 
829), The Employee Retirement Income Security Act and Related White House and Labor 
Department Documents (Sept. 2, 1974), reprinted in 1974 Pens. Rep. (BNA) No 1, at R-1 (Sept. 
16, 1974)). 
2.  John F. Kennedy, Remarks of the President, Rice University Stadium, Houston, Texas 
3 (Sept. 12, 1962), in Press Release, Office of the White House Press Secretary (Sept. 12, 1962) 
(on file with the John F. Kennedy Presidential Library and Museum). 
3.  1 LEX K. LARSON, LARSON’S WORKERS’ COMPENSATION LAW § 1.01 (Matthew Bender, 
Rev. Ed. 2018). 
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compensation claim and must file a notice with the state’s administrative 
agency.4 Around 90% of claims are disposed of without proceeding to a 
formal contest—usually by agreement or settlement between the employee 
and employer.5 By the very nature of a settlement, the agreed-upon amount 
is “apt to be less than the full statutory amount” of benefits.6 For many 
employees, the story does not end there. 
     If an employee’s health coverage paid any medical expenses, the health 
plan might seek reimbursement from the workers’ compensation settlement 
proceeds. If the health plan is maintained by the employer, it is governed by 
ERISA.7 Because of a series of Supreme Court rulings, and as long as the plan 
terms so provide, the ERISA-governed health plan (ERISA plan) can obtain 
reimbursement from the full amount of the settlement, regardless of how 
much of that settlement actually represents past medical expenses.8 Because 
even a full award of statutory workers’ compensation benefits are intended 
only to keep injured workers from destitution9 and because a settlement is, 
by definition, an amount less than a full award, an ERISA plan’s uninhibited 
right to reimbursement can prevent an injured employee from obtaining 
practical relief. 
     While scholarly criticism of ERISA abounds, little attention has been given 
to the problems ERISA plan reimbursement presents to a workers’ 
compensation claimant.10 While overlooked, the problem has the potential to 
be pervasive because ERISA governs most private-sector health plans.11 In 
2013, the Supreme Court issued its ruling allowing employers merely to 
insert plan language and thereby trump any defense that would reduce the 
                                                
4.  Id. § 126.01. 
5.  Id. § 132.01. 
6.  Id. § 132.03. 
7.  29 U.S.C. § 1002(1) (2017). 
8.  See infra Section III.A. 
9.  13 LEX K. LARSON, LARSON’S WORKERS’ COMPENSATION LAW § 133.01 (Matthew Bender, 
Rev. Ed. 2018); Jay M. Zitter, Annotation, Validity, Construction, and Effect of Statutory 
Exemptions of Proceeds of Workers' Compensation Awards, 48 A.L.R.5th 473 (1997). 
10.  See, e.g., Kristen S. Cross et al., ERISA-Governed Healthcare Liens, 78 ALA. LAW. 346, 
349 (2017); Jonathan M. Feigenbaum, Summary Overview of Short-Term-Disability Benefits, 
Long-Term-Disability Benefits and Co-Ordination with Other Benefits and Settlements Under 
the Employee Retirement Security Act of 1974, MASS. EMP. LAWS. ASS’N (Mar. 22, 2017), 
https://www.erisaattorneys.com/wp-content/uploads/2015/01/MELA-STD-LTD-
Presentation.pdf; Jill Bollwek, ERISA Health Plan Reimbursement in Workers’ Compensation 
Cases, MO. DEP’T LAB., https://labor.mo.gov/sites/labor/files/Understanding-and-Resolving-
ERISA-Handout.pdf (last visited Feb. 8, 2019).  
11.  Health Plans & Benefits, U.S. DEP’T LAB., https://www.dol.gov/general/topic/health-
plans (last visited Dec. 2, 2018). 
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amount reimbursed to reflect either the cost of obtaining a settlement or a 
claimant’s true recovery.12 As more plans adopt favorable language, the 
number of injured workers unable to obtain practical relief will grow. A local 
workers’ compensation attorney has had several cases where an ERISA plan 
asserts a full right to recovery against a compromise settlement—sometimes 
years after the settlement agreement is made—and attests that many of his 
colleagues have faced similar situations.13 
     Part I sets forth the issue. Part II explains generally how workers’ 
compensation works: its origin and rationale, the basis and extent of 
compensation benefits, and some procedural aspects of compensation 
claims. Part II also explains why ERISA was enacted and how Congress made 
its enforcement an exclusively federal matter. Part III walks through a series 
of Supreme Court cases that provide a framework for how an employer-
provided healthcare plan may use ERISA’s remedies provisions to enforce its 
right of reimbursement. Part IV explores how an injured worker may 
effectively be unable to obtain relief due to the Supreme Court’s 
interpretation of ERISA’s remedies. Part V interprets how the Supreme 
Court’s reimbursement framework might apply differently when a plan seeks 
reimbursement against a workers’ compensation settlement rather than 
against a third-party tort recovery. Part VI proposes solutions for how to 
equitably resolve the injured worker’s dilemma. 
II. BACKGROUND 
     The particular problem at issue arises at the intersection of workers’ 
compensation schemes and ERISA. The substance and purpose of both are 
set forth below. 
A. Workers’ Compensation Insurance 
     Worker’s compensation acts are state laws14 that mostly came into effect 
in the early twentieth century.15 After Hawai’i adopted its system in 1963, all 
states have now enacted compensation acts.16 Soon after, a doomed attempt 
                                                
12.  US Airways, Inc. v. McCutchen, 569 U.S. 88 (2013). 
13.  Interview with B. Patrick Agnew, partner at Agnew, Johnson & Rosenberger, PLLC, 
in Lynchburg, Va. (Feb. 7, 2019). 
14.  An exception is the Longshore and Harbor Workers’ Compensation Act. 33 U.S.C. §§ 
901–950. 
15.  1 LEX K. LARSON, LARSON’S WORKERS’ COMPENSATION LAW § 2.07 (Matthew Bender, 
Rev. Ed. 2018). 
16.  Id. § 2.08. 
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was made at imposing at least some uniform standards at the federal level.17 
There are legislative and administrative differences between every state’s 
compensation scheme,18 but they are largely similar. 
     Essentially, workers’ compensation acts automatically entitle an employee 
who suffers a “personal injury by accident arising out of and in the course of 
employment” or an “occupational disease” to certain benefits.19 Employees 
are covered, but workers classified as independent contractors are not.20 
Entitlement to compensation is a form of strict liability: the test of liability is 
not the negligence or fault of the parties, but whether the injury is connected 
with the employment.21 
     The strict liability plan of compensation schemes later became known as 
a “grand bargain”22 between employers and laborers. In the grand bargain, 
employees gave up their right to any claim of negligence against their 
employers in order to receive automatic medical and wage benefits (the 
“exclusive remedy” provision).23 Employers gave up common-law defenses 
that would have protected them against an action by employees, such as 
contributory negligence, assumption of risk, and the fellow-servant doctrine, 
in order to reduce liability exposure to only lost wages and medical care.24 
The underlying social theory is to provide “fixed, certain and speedy” relief 
“at a time when most needed”25 to provide support and prevent destitution.26  
     This grand bargain has reverberations throughout the whole of 
compensation acts and administration. Workers’ compensation awards 
wage-loss benefits, not in full, but between half and two-thirds of the 
employee’s average weekly wage.27 Wage-loss benefits are also subject to 
                                                
17.  Id. (describing the National Commission on State Workmen’s Compensation Laws, 
which submitted its report in July 1972). 
18.  Id. 
19.  Id. § 1.01. 
20.  Id. 
21.  1 LEX K. LARSON, LARSON’S WORKERS’ COMPENSATION LAW § 1.03 (Matthew Bender, 
Rev. Ed. 2018). 
22.  See, e.g., Gibby v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 404 P.3d 44, 46–47 (Okla. 2017). 
23.  1 LEX K. LARSON, LARSON’S WORKERS’ COMPENSATION LAW § 1.03 (Matthew Bender, 
Rev. Ed. 2018). 
24.  Id. 
25.  Humphrees v. Boxley Bros. Co., 135 S.E. 890, 891 (Va. 1926). 
26.  1 LEX K. LARSON, LARSON’S WORKERS’ COMPENSATION LAW § 1.02 (Matthew Bender, 
Rev. Ed. 2018); Jay M. Zitter, Annotation, Validity, Construction, and Effect of Statutory 
Exemptions of Proceeds of Workers’ Compensation Awards, 48 A.L.R.5th 473 (1997). 
27.  1 LEX K. LARSON, LARSON’S WORKERS’ COMPENSATION LAW §§ 1.01, 1.03 (Matthew 
Bender, Rev. Ed. 2018). 
120 LIBERTY UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 14:1 
 
arbitrary limits, or caps, so as to prevent malingering.28 Claims are handled 
administratively in almost all states.29 Relaxed rules of procedure and 
evidence apply: compared to a trial court, discovery is more expansive 
regarding medical information, but otherwise more restrictive.30 While the 
social policy motivating compensation law ignores the concept of fault long 
enough to get the injured worker relief, workers’ compensation does not 
exonerate every at-fault party.31 An employee cannot pursue relief against the 
employer but may do so against a third party.32 If an employee does recover 
against a third party, the employer typically has a right to receive its outlay 
from the employee, preventing double recovery by the employee.33  
     While compensation acts are creatures of state governments, the 
compensation system is a private one, composed of transactions between 
employers, insurance carriers, and employees.34 All states require employers 
to secure their compensation liability, though the permissible means vary 
significantly, and all but two states allow self-insurance.35 Although the cost 
of providing workers’ compensation is to be borne by the employer “as a part 
of the expense of the business,”36 the consumers of the products or services 
created by the employer ultimately bear the cost of this grand bargain.37  
     The final relevant aspect of compensation law is what happens when a 
compensation claim is disputed. Though relief is to be “swift and sure,”38 the 
claimant must still prove either an “injury by accident” or an “occupational 
disease” “arising out of” and incurred “in the course of” employment.39 These 
                                                
28.  Id. § 1.03. 
29.  11 LEX K. LARSON, LARSON’S WORKERS’ COMPENSATION LAW § 124.01 (Matthew 
Bender, Rev. Ed. 2018). 
30.  J. Randolph Ward, Primary Issues in Compensation Litigation, 17 CAMPBELL L. REV. 
443, 444 (1995). 
31.  10 LEX K. LARSON, LARSON’S WORKERS’ COMPENSATION LAW § 110.01 (Matthew 
Bender, Rev. Ed. 2018). 
32.  See, e.g., Mich. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Smoot, 149 F. Supp. 2d 229 (E.D. Va. 2001) (applying 
Virginia law); Smith v. Payne, 753 P.2d 1162 (Ariz. 1988); Chesapeake Haven Land Corp. v. 
Litzenberg, 785 A.2d 859 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2001). 
33.  10 LEX K. LARSON, LARSON’S WORKERS’ COMPENSATION LAW § 110.02 (Matthew 
Bender, Rev. Ed. 2018). 
34.  Id. 
35.  14 LEX K. LARSON, LARSON’S WORKERS’ COMPENSATION LAW § 150.01 (Matthew 
Bender, Rev. Ed. 2018). 
36.  Humphrees v. Boxley Bros. Co., 135 S.E. 890, 891 (Va. 1926). 
37.  1 LEX K. LARSON, LARSON’S WORKERS’ COMPENSATION LAW § 1.03 (Matthew Bender, 
Rev. Ed. 2018). 
38.  Rorie v. Holly Farms Poultry Co., 295 S.E.2d 458, 460 (N.C. 1982). 
39.  1 LEX K. LARSON, LARSON’S WORKERS’ COMPENSATION LAW § 1.01 (Matthew Bender, 
Rev. Ed. 2018). 
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elements, while illuminated by state case law, provide plenty of room for 
dispute, and result in the practical reality that a claimant might need to obtain 
an attorney. The grand ideal of compensation law is that benefits issue 
automatically once statutory prerequisites are met.40 But because 
compensation involves complex issues (with the need to sift through state 
case law and evidentiary problems), a claimant has the right to counsel.41 In 
most states, a claimant’s attorney’s fee is deducted from the award, which 
might be seen as a necessary evil because it reduces an award already 
calculated to provide minimum support.42 An attorney’s ability to obtain 
higher awards and settlements, and a better likelihood of prevailing, offset 
that reduction of relief.43 
B. ERISA-Governed Healthcare Plans 
     Unlike workers’ compensation coverage, healthcare plans do not arise by 
operation of a statute. Health benefits, like any other fringe benefit, arise by 
contract between employee and employer. If an employer offers a healthcare 
benefit plan, it is governed by ERISA.44 While the “retirement” in ERISA’s 
name suggests a relation to retirement, its regulatory reach extends to all 
employer-maintained benefit plans. ERISA came about because of the poor 
financial decisions of the American company Studebaker in the early 1960s. 
 1. The Purpose of ERISA 
     After the Studebaker-Packard Corporation closed its South Bend, Indiana, 
auto manufacturing plant, many thousands of employees soon discovered 
that the company’s pension plan was essentially nonexistent.45 The scandal of 
                                                
40.  13 LEX K. LARSON, LARSON’S WORKERS’ COMPENSATION LAW § 133.05 (Matthew 
Bender, Rev. Ed. 2018). 
41.  Id. 
42.  Id. § 133.01. 
43.  “[I]t is unrealistic to expect that workers will receive prompt, equitable, and adequate 
benefits, or anything approaching them, if they are left without the opportunity to obtain legal 
representation. Even if defense attorneys were also eliminated, there would remain the need 
of inexperienced claimants for assistance in having to contend with professionals [insurance 
company employees] on issues arising under a complicated and unfamiliar law.” 13 LEX K. 
LARSON, LARSON’S WORKERS’ COMPENSATION LAW § 133.05 n.7 (Matthew Bender, Rev. Ed. 
2018) (alterations in original) (quoting National Comm’n on State Workmen’s Comp. Laws, 
Compendium on Workmen’s Compensation, ch. 13, at 212 (1973)). 
44.  Paul M. Secunda, Sorry, No Remedy: Intersectionality and the Grand Irony of ERISA, 
61 HASTINGS L.J. 131, 136 (2009). 
45.  James A. Wooten, “The Most Glorious Story of Failure in the Business”: The 
Studebaker-Packard Corporation and the Origins of ERISA, 49 BUFF. L. REV. 683, 683–84 
(2001). 
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Studebaker’s employees losing pensions that they had spent their careers 
earning was the political motivation for federal pension reform.46 
     The broad and detailed declaration of congressional policy for ERISA 
provides “that disclosure be made and safeguards be provided with respect to 
the establishment, operation, and administration of [employee benefit] 
plans” and that “minimum standards be provided assuring the equitable 
character of such plans and their financial soundness.”47 Though prompted 
by pension reform, ERISA governs not only pension plans but also “any plan, 
fund, or program . . . maintained by an employer . . . for the purpose of 
providing . . . medical, surgical, or hospital care or benefits, or benefits in the 
event of sickness, accident, [or] disability.”48 ERISA covers most private-
sector health plans.49 Plans maintained solely for workers’ compensation 
coverage are not covered by ERISA.50 ERISA established procedural 
standards for reporting, disclosure, and fiduciary responsibility for these 
employee welfare benefit plans, but does not regulate the substantive content 
of the plans.51 ERISA plans typically designate an administrator, though the 
employer is the default by statute, and the administrator is “generally an alter-
ego of the employer.”52 
 2. Exclusive Federal Jurisdiction of ERISA 
     Federal courts have confirmed that Congress “intended that a body of 
Federal substantive law will be developed by the courts to deal with issues 
involving rights and obligations under private welfare and pension plans.”53 
Congress did so by, inter alia, providing statutory causes of action 
                                                
46.  Id. 
47.  29 U.S.C. § 1001(a) (2017). 
48.  29 U.S.C. § 1002(1) (2017). 
49.  Health Plans & Benefits, U.S. DEP’T LAB., https://www.dol.gov/general/topic/health-
plans (last accessed Dec. 28, 2018). 
50.  29 U.S.C. § 1003(b)(3) (2017). 
51.  Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. Mass., 471 U.S. 724, 732 (1985). 
52.  29 U.S.C. § 1002(16)(A) (2017); Dana Muir & Norman Stein, Two Hats, One Head, 
No Heart: The Anatomy of the ERISA Settlor/Fiduciary Distinction, 93 N.C. L. REV. 459, 520 
(2015). 
53.  Amato v. Bernard, 618 F.2d 559, 567 (9th Cir. 1980). 
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enumerated in 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a),54 exclusive federal jurisdiction for all 
actions brought under ERISA Title I,55 and broad preemption of state law. 
     ERISA’s preemption clause provides that “the provisions of this 
title . . . shall supersede any and all State laws insofar as they may now or 
hereafter relate to any employee benefit plan.”56 The Supreme Court has 
given ERISA broad preemptive power, holding that “[a] law ‘relates to’ an 
employee benefit plan . . . if it has a connection with or reference to such a 
plan.”57 The “insurance savings clause,”58 a major exception to state-law 
preemption, specifies that state laws regulating insurance, banking, or 
securities survive ERISA preemption.59 But those surviving state laws do not 
reach ERISA-governed plans that are funded by the employer as opposed to 
merely insured. This route to preemption, under ERISA’s “deemer clause,”60 
is gaining significance as more employers create self-funded plans to avoid 
state regulation.61 The Supreme Court case FMC Corp. v. Holliday illustrates 
the interaction of these preemption provisions.62 In Holliday, the Court 
found that ERISA preempted a state anti-subrogation law that prohibited 
reimbursement of healthcare benefits from a claimant’s tort recovery.63 The 
state law survived preemption thanks to ERISA’s insurance savings clause but 
                                                
54.  Each cause of action authorized under the statute describes the proper plaintiff. 
Potential plaintiffs consist of four groups: plan participants, plan beneficiaries, plan 
fiduciaries, and the Secretary of Labor. David M. Cook & Karen M. Wahle, Procedural Aspects 
of Litigating ERISA Claims, A.B.A. (2000), http://apps.americanbar.org/labor/lel-aba-annual/ 
papers/2000/wahle.pdf (last visited Feb. 8, 2019). 
55.  29 U.S.C. § 1132(e)(1) (2017). There is one exception wherein an action brought under 
29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(1)(B) to recover benefits under the terms of a plan may be filed in state or 
federal court. 
56.  29 U.S.C. § 1144(a) (2017). 
57.  Shaw v. Delta Air Lines, Inc. 463 U.S. 85, 96–97 (1983). 
58.  29 U.S.C. § 1144(b)(2)(A) (2017). 
59.  Edward Alburo Morrissey, Deem and Deemer: ERISA Preemption Under the Deemer 
Clause As Applied to Employer Health Care Plans with Stop-Loss Insurance, 23 J. LEGIS. 307, 
308 (1997).  
60.  The clause provides that “an employee benefit plan . . . shall [not] be deemed to be an 
insurance company or other insurer . . . in the business of insurance . . . for purposes of any 
law of any State purporting to regulate insurance companies.” 29 U.S.C. § 1144(b)(2)(B) 
(2017). Any healthcare plan “established or maintained by an employer” is an employee 
benefit plan under ERISA. 29 U.S.C. § 1002(1) (2017). 
61.  Secunda, supra note 44, at 131, 145 (citing COLLEEN MEDILL, INTRODUCTION TO 
EMPLOYEE BENEFITS LAW: POLICY AND PRACTICE 307 (2d ed. 2007) (stating that in 2006, 55% of 
workers with employer-sponsored healthcare coverage were participants in a partially or fully 
employer-funded plan)). 
62.  FMC Corp. v. Holliday, 498 U.S. 52 (1990). 
63.  Id. at 65. 
124 LIBERTY UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 14:1 
 
ultimately did not benefit the claimant because the law, as applied to a self-
funded plan, fell within ERISA’s deemer clause.64 
III. SUPREME COURT JURISPRUDENCE ON ERISA REMEDIES FOR PLAN 
REIMBURSEMENT 
     A series of Supreme Court cases provides a framework for the right of an 
ERISA plan to seek reimbursement for medical expenses paid to a plan 
participant (i.e., participating employee) who later receives a collateral 
recovery for those expenses. Scholars have been critical of both the reasoning 
and the consequences of those rulings, not least because Congress may never 
have intended what the Court has imputed to it. 
A. Appropriate Equitable Relief—Mertens and Its Progeny  
     ERISA itself has no provision granting covered plans a right of 
subrogation or reimbursement. ERISA does provide a cause of action 
authorizing a participant, beneficiary, or fiduciary “to obtain . . . appropriate 
equitable relief . . . to enforce any . . . terms of the plan,” also known as the 
“catchall provision.”65  
1. ERISA Authorizes Only “Equitable” Relief 
     In Mertens v. Hewitt Associates, a pension plan sponsor defaulted on some 
benefits.66 The injured beneficiaries pursued compensatory damages under 
29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(3) against a nonfiduciary, an actuarial firm, for willingly 
participating in an ERISA-specified fiduciary’s breach of duty.67 The Supreme 
Court skirted the certified question regarding nonfiduciary liability in 
holding that “equitable” relief under ERISA did not authorize consequential 
monetary damages.68 Justice Scalia, for the majority, wrote that the term 
“equitable relief” refers to the “categories of relief that were typically available 
in equity (such as injunction, mandamus, and restitution).”69 Because 
compensatory damages were the classic form of legal, as opposed to equitable 
relief, ERISA’s catchall provision did not authorize them.70 The struggle to 
                                                
64.  Morrissey, supra note 59, at 309–10. 
65.  29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(3) (2017). 
66.  John H. Langbein, What ERISA Means by “Equitable”: The Supreme Court’s Trail of 
Error in Russell, Mertens, and Great-West, 103 COL. L. REV. 1317, 1348–49 (2003). 
67.  Id. 
68.  Id. at 1349–50. 
69.  Mertens v. Hewitt Assocs., 508 U.S. 248, 256 (1993). 
70.  Id. at 248. 
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determine what relief sought under ERISA falls in an equitable category 
began with Mertens. 
 2. Reimbursement of Health Plans Under ERISA 
     Next, in Great-West Life & Annuity Insurance Company v. Knudson, the 
Supreme Court reaffirmed the Mertens conception of equitable relief as 
encompassing the forms of relief typically available in equity.71 The Court 
established a two-prong test for whether a plaintiff seeks “equitable relief” 
under ERISA: both “‘the basis for [the plaintiff’s] claim’ and the nature of the 
underlying remedies sought” must be equitable.72 In order to satisfy those 
prongs, Justice Scalia recommended consulting standard current works on 
equity.73 Great-West sought an injunction to compel the payment of money 
past due under a contract.74 The basis for that claim was not equitable, but 
legal.75 Great-West alternatively sought restitution, which it characterized as 
equitable relief.76 The Court held that restitution could be either legal or 
equitable; the nature of the remedy sought by Great-West was not equitable 
because it sought personal liability and not a lien against a particular fund.77 
     The Supreme Court’s 2006 decision in Sereboff expanded healthcare plans’ 
power to receive reimbursement.78 The Sereboffs suffered injuries from an 
auto accident, and Mid Atlantic paid their medical expenses under a plan 
covered by ERISA.79 After the Sereboffs settled a tort suit with third parties, 
Mid Atlantic sued the Sereboffs under 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(3) to enforce the 
“Acts of Third Parties” reimbursement provision in the plan.80 Pending 
outcome of the suit, the Sereboffs set aside the amount claimed in an 
investment account.81 The Sereboff Court distinguished Great-West on the 
ground that in Great-West, the funds claimed were in a trust and not in the 
defendant’s possession.82 Instead, the Court relied on Barnes v. Alexander83 
                                                
71.  Great-West Life & Annuity Ins. Co. v. Knudson, 534 U.S. 204, 210 (2002). 
72.  Id. at 213 (alteration in original) (citation omitted). 
73.  Id. at 217. 
74.  Id. at 210. 
75.  Id. at 211. 
76.  Great-West Life & Annuity Ins. Co. v. Knudson, 534 U.S. 204, 212 (2002). 
77.  Id. at 212–14. 
78.  Kristin L. Huffaker, Where the Windfall Falls Short: “Appropriate Equitable Relief” 
after Sereboff v. Mid Atlantic Medical Services, Inc., 61 OKLA. L. REV. 233, 234 (2008). 
79.  Sereboff v. Mid Atl. Med. Servs., Inc., 547 U.S. 356, 360 (2006). 
80.  Id. 
81.  Id. 
82.  Id. at 362. 
83.  Barnes v. Alexander, 232 U.S. 117 (1914). 
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in holding that Mid Atlantic’s claim was indistinguishable from an “equitable 
lien by agreement” and that Mid Atlantic could “follow” a portion of the 
recovery into the Sereboffs’ hands as soon as the fund was identified.84 Thus, 
the Sereboff decision authorized healthcare plans to assert any right of 
reimbursement provided for by the plan terms against any “specifically 
identifiable” funds that are “within the possession and control” of the 
participant.85 
     Next, the Supreme Court decided US Airways, Inc. v. McCutchen, where a 
health plan pursued reimbursement of $66,866 from a participant who 
received $66,000 after subtraction of the attorney’s fee from a third-party 
settlement.86 McCutchen argued that unjust enrichment principles should 
reduce the plan’s recovery.87 Specifically, McCutchen contended that in 
equity, an insurer could recover no more than an insured’s “double 
recovery”: that which was received from the third party that compensated for 
the same loss as the insurance already covered.88 McCutchen also argued that 
the “common-fund doctrine” should apply, reducing the amount paid to the 
insurer by the proportion of the attorney’s fee, and therefore accurately 
reflect the cost of obtaining the recovery.89 The Court followed Sereboff in 
holding that the agreement itself (the ERISA plan’s terms) governs since the 
nature of the lien was an “equitable lien by agreement.”90 The plan term 
requiring reimbursement was as follows: 
If [US Airways] pays benefits for any claim you incur as the 
result of negligence, willful misconduct, or other actions of 
a third party, . . . [y]ou will be required to reimburse [US 
Airways] for amounts paid for claims out of any monies 
recovered from [the] third party, including, but not limited 
to, your own insurance company as the result of judgment, 
settlement, or otherwise.91 
But even though the terms of the plan will control subrogation rights and 
defenses, the silence of the plan may allow equitable defenses, such as the 
                                                
84.  Sereboff v. Mid Atl. Med. Servs., Inc., 547 U.S. 356, 364–65 (2006). 
85.  Id. at 362–63. 
86.  US Airways, Inc. v. McCutchen, 569 U.S. 88, 92 (2013). 
87.  Id. at 95–96. 
88.  Id. 
89.  Id. The common-fund doctrine is supposed to prevent freeloading. T. Leigh Anenson, 
Equitable Defenses in the Age of Statutes, 36 REV. LITIG. 659, 666 n.17 (2018).  
90.  McCutchen, 569 U.S. at 98.  
91.  Id. at 92 (alterations in original). 
2020]  PHENOMENAL COSMIC POWERS  127 
 
common-fund doctrine, as an appropriate default understanding of the 
parties’ intent.92 
     The effect of McCutchen was dramatic. If the plan terms so provide (and 
after McCutchen there is no reason why they would not),93 an ERISA plan 
administrator is armed with a right to reimbursement enforceable solely in 
federal court. That reimbursement is not subject to reduction by either state 
laws restricting subrogation nor by equitable defenses that reflect the reality 
of the cost of obtaining a settlement.  
3. Right of Reimbursement Against a Workers’ Compensation 
Settlement 
     A health plan can seek reimbursement from a workers’ compensation 
settlement.94 In an unpublished decision, a federal trial court followed 
Holliday in finding that ERISA preempted a state law prohibiting health 
plans from imposing a lien against workers’ compensation awards.95 
Although decided before McCutchen, the court in Tackett used the same 
reasoning in holding that the terms of the plan control, and that the term at 
issue was “crystal clear.”96 The plan term at issue was as follows: 
[A] plan participant must repay plan benefits when “you or 
your covered Dependent achieve any recovery 
whatsoever, through a legal action or settlement in 
connection with any sickness or Injury alleged to have been 
caused by a third party, regardless of whether or not some or 
all of the amount recovered was specifically for the Medical 
or Dental expenses for which Plan benefits were paid[.]”97 
Although the settlement documents stipulated that no portion of the 
settlement represented payment for medical expenses, the court found that 
the $105,000 settlement undercut that representation and that the language 
                                                
92.  Id. at 101–102. 
93.  “Federal case law has provided plan sponsors of the Employee Retirement Income 
Security Act of 1974 (ERISA) covered plans with the ability to insert plan provisions that are 
more favorable to the plan sponsor rather than the plan participant or beneficiary.” Kathryn 
J. Kennedy, Protective Plan Provisions for Employer-Sponsored Employee Benefit Plans, 18 
MARQ. BENEFITS & SOC. WELFARE L. REV. 1, 1 (2016). 
94.  Graphic Commc’ns Nat’l Health & Welfare Fund v. Tackett, No. 07-cv-0123-MJR, 
2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 38121 (S.D. Ill. May 9, 2008). 
95.  Id. at *7. 
96.  Id. 
97.  Id. at *7–8 (alteration in original). 
128 LIBERTY UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 14:1 
 
was an attempt to circumvent the plan’s lien.98 The court regretted that the 
reimbursement caused the injured workers to receive less money for their 
injuries, but said that the situation could have been avoided if the health plan 
had been invited to the negotiation table.99 The Employer’s Guide to Self-
Insuring Health Benefits noted that this decision adds workers’ compensation 
awards to the types of funds accessible to reimbursement actions.100 
     This line of Supreme Court decisions has practical ramifications for 
workers’ compensation claimants. The claimant must entice the ERISA plan 
administrator to the negotiation table along with the employer and workers’ 
compensation insurer. If the ERISA plan does not agree to abide by the 
settlement’s allocation of past medical expenses, it has a Supreme-Court-
approved right to recover against the full settlement proceeds, an amount 
that might be significantly reduced by a claimant’s need for speedy relief to 
feed hungry mouths at home. While the settlement’s allocation of past 
medical expenses in Tackett was plainly a sham,101 the Supreme Court gives 
a more honest claimant no greater likelihood of protection. 
B. Scholarly Criticism of the Supreme Court’s Framework 
     Many scholars have been critical of the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence on 
“equitable relief” under ERISA. A more colorful critic, Professor Secunda, 
wrote that the Mertens definition of “equitable relief” led to fifteen years of 
Supreme Court cases that were “bizarre and contrary to the original purposes 
of ERISA.”102  
 1. A High Court Schism 
     Professor Secunda described a decades-long Supreme Court battle, 
beginning in Massachusetts Mutual Life Insurance Co. v. Russell, between a 
literalist approach, strictly limiting ERISA remedies based on structural 
arguments, and a remedialist approach, seeking to establish ordinary trust 
law as the touchstone for ERISA’s remedies.103 Professor Muir, whose work 
on ERISA remedies was cited in Great-West,104 gave a milder reproach when 
                                                
98.  Id. at *9. 
99.  Id. at *11. 
100.  EMPLOYER'S GUIDE TO SELF-INSURING HEALTH BENEFITS ¶ 720 (2019). 
101.  Graphic Commc’ns Nat’l Health & Welfare Fund v. Tackett, No. 07-CV-0123-MJR, 
2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 38121, at *9 (S.D. Ill. May 9, 2008). 
102.  Paul M. Secunda, Sorry, No Remedy: Intersectionality and the Grand Irony of ERISA, 
61 HASTINGS L.J. 131, 149 (2009). 
103.  Mass. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Russell, 473 U.S. 134 (1985); Secunda, supra note 102, at 
159–60. 
104.  Great-West Life & Annuity Ins. Co. v. Knudson, 534 U.S. 204, 212–213, 215 (2002). 
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she said that evaluating whether a remedy was typically available in equity is 
a “quixotic mission.”105 Justice Ginsburg, dissenting in Great-West, criticized 
the literalist majority as “exhum[ing] . . . an ancient classification unrelated 
to the substance of the relief sought; and . . . obstruct[ing] the general goals 
of ERISA.”106 
     Following Great-West, Professor Langbein wrote an oft-cited article 
criticizing the literalists’ approach to “equitable relief.”107 His criticism had 
two parts: first, the Supreme Court fumbled its technical understanding of 
historical equity practice, and second, the Court ignored Congress’s 
intention to subject covered plans to pre-existing trust law. In Mertens, 
Justice Scalia listed injunction, mandamus, and restitution as the typical 
categories of equitable relief, but he was obliged to walk back that 
characterization of restitution in Great-West, while mandamus was 
exclusively a legal remedy—“a gaping historical error.”108 Professor Langbein 
explained that Congress made every benefit plan a trust, specified the ways 
in which a person becomes a fiduciary thereof, described the essentials of 
fiduciary law, and created the means for federal courts to develop a common 
law of ERISA plans,109 only for its remedies, which track traditional trust 
remedies, to be gutted by restrictive Court decisions.110  
     Professor Secunda cataloged some glaring instances of particularly unjust 
results from the intersection of ERISA’s preemption provisions and judicial 
interpretation of its remedial provisions.111 For example, in Corcoran v. 
United Healthcare, Inc., a patient with a high-risk pregnancy was denied an 
extended hospital stay by her health plan against the recommendation of her 
doctor.112 After she returned home, she lost the baby.113 She and her husband 
filed a wrongful death lawsuit based on the negligence of the health plan, 
which the defendants removed to federal court on ERISA preemption 
grounds.114 The Fifth Circuit held that the only possible remedy was a benefits 
                                                
105.  Dana Muir, From Schism to Prism: Equitable Relief in Employee Benefit Plans, 55 AM. 
BUS. L.J. 599, 624 (2018). 
106.  Great-West, 534 U.S. at 224. 
107.  John H. Langbein, What ERISA Means by “Equitable”: The Supreme Court’s Trail of 
Error in Russell, Mertens, and Great-West, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 1317 (2003). 
108.  Id. at 1321. 
109.  Id. at 1324–33. 
110.  Id. at 1355. 
111.  Secunda, supra note 102, at 155–58. 
112.  Corcoran v. United Healthcare, 965 F.2d 1321, 1324 (5th Cir. 1992), abrogated on 
other grounds by Mertens v. Hewitt Assocs., 508 U.S. 248 (1993).  
113.  Id. 
114.  Id. at 1324–25. 
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eligibility determination under ERISA § 1132(a)(1)(B), and that 
compensatory and punitive damages were wholly unavailable.115 
 2. The Drafter’s Intent as to ERISA Remedies 
     Statements from individuals involved in creating ERISA have suggested 
that the Supreme Court’s convoluted pronouncements of “equitable” relief 
are merely due to clumsy drafting. Frank Cummings, counsel for the Senate 
Labor Committee and involved with early drafts of ERISA,116 criticized the 
Mertens decision when he said “we knew damn well you could get money in 
equity” because he practiced in Maryland before the merger of law and 
equity.117 Robert Nagle, the General Counsel of the Senate Committee on 
Labor and Public Welfare during the period before the passage of ERISA,118 
said: 
[ERISA] Section 502(a)(3)119 . . . was clearly intended . . . to 
provide any sort of appropriate relief. . . . [D]rafting 
carelessness gave Scalia the opening to do what he 
did. . . . [I]t was an inadvertent mistake. If anybody had said 
in our drafting group, “wait a minute, we’ve got legal and 
equitable everywhere else, let’s put . . .” we would have said, 
“of course.” I mean there was no intention whatsoever to 
restrict the sort of relief.120  
     Regardless of what the drafters intended, a party seeking recovery under 
an ERISA cause of action must hew to Supreme Court guidance on available 
remedies. 
 3. A Refined Understanding of Great-West’s Two-Prong Test 
     In Great-West, the Supreme Court established a two-prong test for 
whether a plaintiff seeks “equitable relief” under ERISA: both “‘the basis for 
[the plaintiff’s] claim’ and the nature of the underlying remedies sought” 
                                                
115.  Id. at 1338. 
116.  Panel 1: Setting the Stage: History Before the Ninety-Third Congress, 6 DREXEL L. REV. 
265, 267 & n. 3 (2014). 
117.  Panel 4: ERISA and the Fiduciary, 6 DREXEL L. REV. 359, 374 (2014). 
118.  Panel 2: Making Sausage—the Ninety-Third Congress and ERISA, 6 DREXEL L. REV. 
291, 296 (2014). 
119.  Codified at 29 U.S.C. § 1132. 
120.  Panel 6: Benefit Disputes and Enforcement Under ERISA, 6 DREXEL L. REV. 409, 421–
22 (2014). 
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must be equitable.121 Professor Muir sheds some light on this test by 
discussing an exploration of fifteen years of Supreme Court equity cases 
conducted by Professor Bray.122 The Court gradually shifted in its law of 
remedies over eleven different cases during that timeframe, including Great-
West, Sereboff, and McCutchen.123 According to Professor Bray, the historical 
investigation encouraged by the Court is “a fool’s errand.”124 The 
fundamental questions the Court answers are “Is the requested relief 
equitable?” and “What principles shape the availability of equitable relief?”125 
Professor Muir applies this understanding to Great-West’s test: the “nature 
of the underlying remed[y]” prong asks whether the requested relief is 
equitable, and the “basis of the claim” prong asks what principles shape the 
availability of equitable relief.126  
     The Supreme Court has not applied its two-prong test consistently in each 
successive case.127 Rather than using its own test as a test, the Court has used 
it as a sandbox to “construct[] an idealized history of equity.”128 However, 
Professor Bray considers this to be good jurisprudence:129 it allows a middle 
ground between Justice Scalia’s historical and unpersuasive “static 
approach”130 and Justice Ginsburg’s unhelpful appeal to the “grand aims of 
equity.”131 By exploring whether the nature of the underlying remedy sought 
is equitable, or stated another way, whether the requested relief is equitable, 
relief under ERISA’s remedies provisions can be shaped according to 
equitable principles. 
IV. AN INJURED WORKER’S QUAGMIRE 
     Although the Supreme Court has dealt four times with reimbursement of 
an ERISA plan in the context of a third-party tort recovery,132 it is unlikely to 
                                                
121.  Great-West Life & Annuity Ins. Co. v. Knudson, 534 U.S. 204, 213 (2002) (alteration 
in original) (citation omitted). 
122.  Samuel L. Bray, The Supreme Court and the New Equity, 68 VAND. L. REV. 997 (2015); 
Muir, supra note 105, at 650–53. 
123.  Bray, supra note 122, at 999. 
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126.  Muir, supra note 105, at 650–53. 
127.  Id. at 650. 
128.  Bray, supra note 122, at 1014. 
129.  Id. at 1020. 
130.  Id. at 1019. 
131.  Id. at 1012. 
132.  Montanile v. Bd. of Trs. of Nat’l Elevator Indus. Health Benefit Plan, 136 S. Ct. 651, 
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revisit the issue in the context of a workers’ compensation claim. A contested 
compensation claim subject to reimbursement by an ERISA plan is unlikely 
to go to a trial, let alone go through the several appeals needed to clarify or 
refine Supreme Court precedents in the specific context of a workers’ 
compensation settlement. Workers’ compensation relief is not a windfall. A 
looming ERISA lien compounds the risks, delays, and expenses that might 
make the difference between the time when relief is most needed and when 
relief might come too late. 
A. The Difficulty of Obtaining Relief 
     A diligent lawyer will generally avoid settling one lawsuit only to expose a 
client to another. Therefore, a lawyer should inquire into any obligation to 
reimburse a healthcare plan before resolving a compensation claim. This 
inquiry broadly involves three steps.133 First, if medical expenses have already 
been paid, the lawyer should determine whether ERISA governs the 
healthcare plan; if the plan is employer-provided, then ERISA likely covers 
it.134 Second, the lawyer must “determine how the [ERISA] plan is funded,” 
requiring investigation into ERISA-mandated federal filings.135 Funding is 
relevant to determine whether relevant state law is preempted.136 Third, the 
lawyer should investigate the healthcare plan’s terms by issuing an ERISA 
document request to determine the extent of the right of subrogation or 
reimbursement and whether common-law equitable defenses have been 
exempted by the plan.137 Guidance for plan drafters urges “explicit 
subrogation and reimbursement rights” along with the refutation of any 
common-law equitable defenses.138 After McCutchen, there is a significant 
incentive for the employer to include such provisions in the plan, with no 
downside.139 
     If the lawyer has found an obligation on the part of the client to reimburse 
the plan, obtaining a settlement involves a calculation that has very little 
                                                
Med. Servs., Inc., 547 U.S. 356, 360 (2006); Great-West Life & Annuity Ins. Co. v. Knudson, 
534 U.S. 204, 207 (2002). 
133.  Kristen S. Cross et al., ERISA-Governed Healthcare Liens, 78 ALA. LAW. 346, 349 
(2017). 
134.  Id. 
135.  Id. 
136.  See supra text accompanying notes 60–64. 
137.  Cross, supra note 133, at 349. 
138.  Kathryn J. Kennedy, Protective Plan Provisions for Employer-Sponsored Employee 
Benefit Plans, 18 MARQ. BENEFITS & SOC. WELFARE L. REV. 1, 49 (2016); EMPLOYER’S GUIDE TO 
SELF-INSURING HEALTH BENEFITS ¶ 720 (database updated Mar. 2016). 
139.  Kennedy, supra note 138, at 48–49. 
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margin. As part of the “grand bargain” underlying the compensation system, 
a claimant’s recovery consists solely of medical benefits and wage-loss 
benefits.140 If the potential medical benefits are subject to reimbursement 
without reduction, then the potential recovery for wage-loss benefits alone 
must cover all the expenses involved in making a claim. Those expenses 
include the costs of the action, such as medical witness fees.141 Expenses also 
include, in effect, any reduction in recovery due to a settlement.142 They must 
also include an attorney’s fee, whether paid as a contingency from a 
settlement or as a statutorily set amount from an award of benefits.143 
     Finally, the client needs to have something left over to compensate, at least 
partially, for the loss sustained. Even before deducting the expenses of 
bringing a claim, wage-loss benefits merely keep an injured worker from 
destitution.144 Furthermore, a claimant’s pre-injury average weekly wage 
dictates any wage-loss benefits, so the margin is even smaller for a lower-
wage claimant.145 Under the weight of the costs of an action, the price of an 
attorney, and the inherent compromise of a settlement, a claimant who is 
obligated to pay an unreduced reimbursement to a healthcare plan is less 
likely to receive any real compensation. The claimant will be unable to obtain 
a settlement and is left only with the risk of an all-or-nothing award decision. 
Furthermore, if an appeal after the initial compensation hearing and decision 
becomes necessary, then the prospect of a positive outcome becomes even 
more marginal, and an appeal less likely. Therefore, a compensation claimant 
will probably never come before the Supreme Court, and lower courts are left 
with the black-and-white logic of McCutchen: the plan terms exclusively 
control whether a reimbursement can be reduced. 
B. An Employee Should Not Be Punished for Having a Disputable Claim 
     A claimant described in the above section suffers a significant possibility 
that wage-loss benefits will be unrecoverable merely because some aspect of 
the claim is disputable, and an administrator has denied compensation 
benefits. But if the claimant has already had healthcare expenses paid, should 
                                                
140.  See supra text accompanying notes 22–24. 
141.  13 Lex K. Larson, LARSON’S WORKERS’ COMPENSATION LAW §§ 134.01, 134.02, 134.03 
(Matthew Bender, Rev. Ed. 2019). 
142.  Id. at § 132.03. 
143.  See supra text accompanying notes 42–43. 
144.  13 LEX K. LARSON, LARSON’S WORKERS’ COMPENSATION LAW § 133.01 (Matthew 
Bender, Rev. Ed. 2019); Jay M. Zitter, Annotation, Validity, Construction, and Effect of 
Statutory Exemptions of Proceeds of Workers’ Compensation Awards, 48 A.L.R.5th 473 (1997). 
145.  8 LEX K. LARSON, LARSON’S WORKERS’ COMPENSATION LAW § 93.01(1)(a) (Matthew 
Bender, Rev. Ed. 2019). 
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the possibility of not recovering wage-loss benefits be an acceptable risk 
because the claim is tenuous? After all, in a legitimate claim, benefits are 
supposed to issue automatically.146 Not quite: under employer-provided 
healthcare coverage, the employee pays any deductible, co-insurance, or co-
pay out of pocket as specified by the plan. Under compensation coverage, the 
employee does not pay any medical expenses out of pocket, so long as the 
expenses are “reasonable and necessary” and caused by the work injury.147 So, 
the employee is in a comparatively worse position if he is covered only by the 
healthcare plan. Also, there is still the same need to obtain “prompt, 
equitable, and adequate benefits” whether or not a portion of those benefits 
has already been paid.148 
     The court in Tackett, which held that an ERISA plan could obtain a full 
reimbursement from a workers’ compensation settlement, felt that the 
injured worker’s quandary would have been obviated had he invited the 
health plan to the negotiation table.149 However, this is not always the case. 
After McCutchen, a health plan armed with favorable terms has no legal 
obligation to reduce the amount of its lien against a workers’ compensation 
settlement. Accordingly, an injured worker has no leverage by which to 
ensure that he can recover at least some ultimate recovery from the 
compensation insurer. 
V. ASCERTAINING THE PARAMETERS OF APPROPRIATE EQUITABLE 
REIMBURSEMENT  
     Although some might call it a fool’s errand, determining whether 
requested relief is equitable requires determining what relief a court of equity 
could provide.150 That analysis requires more than citing cases that effectively 
grant a means to enforce the written terms of a contract. In Sereboff, the 
                                                
146.  See supra note 40 and accompanying text. 
147.  8 LEX K. LARSON, LARSON’S WORKERS’ COMPENSATION LAW § 94.03(1) (Matthew 
Bender, Rev. Ed. 2019). 
148.  See supra note 43. 
149.  Graphic Commc’ns Nat’l Health & Welfare Fund v. Tackett, No. 07-CV-0123-MJR, 
2008 WL 2020504, at *4 (S.D. Ill. May 9, 2008). 
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Indus. Health Benefit Plan, 136 S. Ct. 651, 660 (2016) (quoting Mertens v. Hewitt Assocs., 508 
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§ 1132(a)(3). Id. 
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Court found that Mid Atlantic sought to enforce a lien based on an 
agreement.151 In McCutchen, the Court looked exclusively to the plan terms 
to determine the parties’ agreement, saying “if the agreement governs, the 
agreement governs.”152 But to ascertain the true nature of an agreement, a 
court of equity will ultimately look to the intent of the parties.153 
A. The Adhesive Nature of an ERISA Plan 
     According to McCutchen, express terms of the contract prevail over 
background equitable principles.154 But would a court of equity enforce a 
provision in health plan boilerplate language when the party against whom 
the provision is enforced could not reasonably have understood its impact? 
 1. Adhesion Contracts 
     When obtaining employer-provided health care, an employee is faced 
with a take-it-or-leave-it contract. The provisions contained within the fine 
print of an employee fringe benefit are not dickered terms. The plan 
sponsor—the employer—“unilaterally set[s the plan] terms,” including 
subrogation and reimbursement provisions.155 This sort of contract acquired 
the label “adhesion contract” in the twentieth century after the industrial 
revolution prompted the ubiquity of take-it-or-leave-it form contracts.156 
Raymond Saleilles, who coined the term, defined an adhesion contract as 
“preformulated stipulations in which the offeror’s will is predominant and 
the conditions are dictated to an undetermined number of acceptants and 
not to one individual party.”157 Characteristics added by later commentators 
include: 
(a) [T]he continuing and general nature of the offer, (b) the 
monopolistic position or at least the great economic power 
of the offeror, (c) a widespread demand for the goods or 
services offered, and (d) the use of standard forms of type 
contracts, the stipulations of which serve mostly the interests 
                                                
151.  Sereboff v. Mid Atlantic Med. Servs., Inc., 547 U.S. 356, 364 (2006). 
152.  US Airways, Inc. v. McCutchen, 569 U.S. 88, 99 (2013). 
153.  See infra Section V.B. 
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155.  Dana Muir, From Schism to Prism: Equitable Relief in Employee Benefit Plans, 55 AM. 
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156.  Vera Bolgár, The Contract of Adhesion – A Comparison of Theory and Practice, 20 
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of the offeror and the reading, let alone the understanding of 
which, presents difficulties to the offeree.158 
     There can be no doubt that the terms of an employee fringe benefit fall 
squarely within this definition. The ERISA plan sponsor, the employer, offers 
healthcare as a fringe benefit to whomever it determines is eligible. The 
employee has no negotiating power over the ERISA plan’s terms and must 
take them as they are to receive benefits for medical care, a most basic and 
widespread human need.159 Unless the offeree–employee happens to be a 
lawyer familiar with equitable defenses, the offeree doubtlessly has difficulty 
in reading and understanding what a plan means when it excludes the made-
whole rule and the common-fund doctrine within its subrogation provision. 
     The presence of an adhesion contract in contract enforcement is relevant 
for two broad reasons: a contract’s validity according to the adhering party’s 
assent thereto, and public policy that shields an adhering party from the form 
contract’s consequences.160 The official comment to the Uniform 
Commercial Code (UCC) section on unconscionability summarizes the 
public policy as “the prevention of oppression and unfair surprise . . . and not 
of disturbance of [the] allocation of risks because of superior bargaining 
power.”161 But the bar is high for a court to find a signed contract 
unconscionable, and courts are reluctant to interfere with express terms.162 
Under the unconscionability section of the UCC, courts have voided all or 
part of a contract if there was manifest unreasonableness, oppression, unfair 
surprise, inconsistency with the contract’s context, fine print obscuring 
disclaimers, parties’ expectations contrary to the terms, or impairment of 
previous agreements.163  
2. In Framing “Equitable Relief” Under ERISA, the Supreme 
Court Has Not Considered the Adhesiveness of ERISA Plans 
     When the Supreme Court approved the validity of enforcing an equitable 
lien by agreement under ERISA, the two cases it relied upon “from the days 
of the divided bench” involved contracting parties exercising much more 
autonomy than an employee does in signing a form contract from a plan 
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sponsor.164 In Barnes v. Alexander, two attorneys performed work for Barnes, 
who agreed to pay “one-third of the contingent fee” that he was to receive.165 
This created a lien that the other attorneys could recover once Barnes had the 
identified fund in his hands.166 The bargain between the two attorneys was an 
archetypical arm’s-length business transaction. In Walker v. Brown, Brown 
transferred bonds worth $15,000 in order to assist the corporation Lloyd & 
Co.167 In order to facilitate business with a supplier, Brown agreed that the 
bonds would function as security for any debt the supplier had against Lloyd 
& Co.168 This, too, was an arm’s-length transaction, established by a letter 
created for the purpose, and not by Brown adhering to a complex and lengthy 
set of terms as is found in an ERISA plan.  
     The Supreme Court in McCutchen pointed out that the defendant (against 
whom the insurer sought reimbursement) and the United States as amicus 
curiae “fail[ed] to produce a single case in which an equity court applied 
[equitable defenses] when a contract provided to the contrary. . . . [A]ll 
provisions of [an] agreement controlled.”169 This reasoning is circular. The 
question is not whether equitable defenses should apply contrary to the 
agreement, but what terms constitute the actual agreement. When a health 
plan expressly excludes the common-fund rule and the made-whole doctrine, 
in as many words, has an employee truly agreed that he will reimburse the 
health plan out of any worker’s compensation settlement he receives, 
regardless of how much of that settlement represented past medical 
expenses? Unless the employee is well-acquainted with the meaning of 
equitable defenses or consults a lawyer before agreeing to employer-provided 
healthcare, the contention that he has made such an agreement is incredible.  
     An employee, even one who scrupulously reads an employer-provided 
health plan’s terms, might be surprised to learn that some of those terms 
impaired the ability to receive workers’ compensation relief.170 The context 
of entering the health plan agreement is that of an employment relationship, 
which in all fifty states includes both the state-mandated fringe benefit of 
compensation for a work injury and the ability to contest a right to relief after 
an initial claim has been denied. Both parties—the employee and the plan 
                                                
164.  Sereboff v. Mid Atlantic Med. Servs., Inc., 547 U.S. 356, 363 (2006). 
165.  Barnes v. Alexander, 232 U.S. 117, 121 (1914). 
166.  Id. at 123. 
167.  Walker v. Brown, 165 U.S. 654, 655 (1897). 
168.  Id. at 663. 
169.  US Airways, Inc. v. McCutchen, 569 U.S. 88, 100 (2013). 
170.  See supra text accompanying notes 91 and 97 for the plan reimbursement language 
from McCutchen and Tackett. 
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sponsor—have the expectation of workers’ compensation in the background, 
even though the plan terms do not mention it. 
     ERISA authorizes “appropriate equitable relief . . . to enforce any 
provisions of . . . the terms of the plan.”171 The appropriate equitable relief 
authorized under ERISA ought to be enforcement of the terms of the plan 
insofar as they reflect the agreement of the parties. When a plaintiff seeks to 
enforce a plan term, the nature of the underlying remedy sought is not 
equitable if the manner of the enforcement cuts against the intent of the 
parties in coming to an agreement. 
B. Equitable Maxims Applied to an ERISA Plan Agreement 
     Judicial recognition of adhesion contracts, as well as the UCC, arose 
largely after the merger of the courts of law and equity. But the principles in 
play are well known to equity. The system of equity was founded “upon the 
eternal verities of right and justice” as condensed into ordered principles.172 
Equitable maxims are pithy statements embodying the principles underlying 
equitable jurisprudence.173 Two equitable maxims, “equity regards that as 
done which ought to be done” and “equity looks to the intent rather than to 
the form,” are inextricably related.174 Equity must look to the intent and not 
merely to the form to ascertain what ought to be done.175 
Equity always attempts to get at the substance of things, and 
to ascertain, uphold, and enforce rights and duties which 
spring from the real relations of the parties. It will never 
suffer the mere appearance and external form to conceal the 
true purposes, objects, and consequences of a transaction.176 
     Equitable liens arise from the operation of these two maxims. At law, a 
contract action could give, at most, a remedy of damages, while equity gives 
effect to the real intent of the parties by giving a lien upon specific property 
of the promisor.177 The Supreme Court decisions in Great-West and 
                                                
171.  29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(3) (2012). 
172.  1 POMEROY’S EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE § 59, at 75–76 (Spencer W. Symons ed., 5th ed. 
2002). 
173.  2 POMEROY’S EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE § 360, at 4–5 (Spencer W. Symons ed., 5th ed. 
2002). 
174.  2 POMEROY’S EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE § 378, at 41 (Spencer W. Symons ed., 5th ed. 
2002). 
175.  Id. 
176.  Id. (emphasis in original). 
177.  Id. § 380 at 44. 
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Montanile denying reimbursement to health plans relied upon this aspect of 
equitable liens.178 
     Another maxim of equity, “he who seeks equity must do equity,” expresses 
the foundational principle that a court of equity must determine rights and 
remedies in accordance with conscience and good faith.179 Application of the 
maxim takes the more specific sense that in granting equitable relief, the 
court must acknowledge and concede all the equitable rights that belong to 
the defendant and relate to the controversy at hand.180 Relief is conditional 
upon the plaintiff giving the defendant any corresponding equitable rights.181 
For the equity belonging to the defendant to sufficiently “relate to” the relief 
sought by the plaintiff, it must “grow[] out of the very controversy before the 
court, or out of such transactions as the record shows to be a part of its 
history.”182  
     When a court grants equitable relief in the form of reimbursement to a 
health plan, it ought to take into account the equities of the plan participant. 
Here, the situation of an injured worker who has obtained a workers’ 
compensation settlement diverges from the cases reviewed by the Supreme 
Court, where the party against whom reimbursement is sought has obtained 
a third-party tort settlement. The right to retain the proceeds of a third-party 
tort settlement does not arise out of any relationship between the plan 
participant and the health plan. The tort settlement contract is between the 
injured party and the tortfeasor. That transaction is not part of the history of 
any controversy between the employee and the employer. In contrast, the 
right to workers’ compensation benefits certainly is part of that history. The 
employment relationship is the critical link. 
     The operation of state law creates an implicit term in every employment 
contract that a worker has a right to receive wage-loss benefits and medical 
treatment for a work-related injury. The employer is obligated to provide 
those benefits, even though it usually shifts the burden of fulfilling that 
obligation to an insurer. A settlement agreement between the insurer and 
employee binds the employer: “the insurer is the employer’s alter ego.”183 An 
                                                
178.  Montanile v. Bd. of Trs. of Nat’l Elevator Indus. Health Benefit Plan, 136 S. Ct. 651, 
660 (2016); Great-West Life & Annuity Ins. Co. v. Knudson, 534 U.S. 204, 213 (2002). 
179.  2 POMEROY’S EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE § 385, at 51 (Spencer W. Symons ed., 5th ed. 
2002). 
180.  Id. at 51–52. 
181.  Id. at 52. 
182.  Id. § 387 at 59. 
183.  13 LEX K. LARSON, LARSON’S WORKERS’ COMPENSATION LAW § 132.06(2) (Matthew 
Bender, Rev. Ed. 2019). 
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employer must abide by the terms of a settlement agreement even if it is not 
directly a party to the agreement. 
     When an employee contracts to receive ERISA-governed health benefits, 
the bargain is with the employer. ERISA only governs benefit plans that are 
“maintained by the employer.”184 Even though a plan administrator seeking 
reimbursement acts as a fiduciary for (i.e., on behalf of) the plan and its 
beneficiaries, ignoring the employment origin of the healthcare plan would 
be ignoring the “real relations of the parties.”185 Commentators have made 
much of the distinction between a plan settlor186 and a plan fiduciary for 
purposes of determining a breach of fiduciary duty.187 Generally speaking, 
that distinction is relevant for the purposes of whether an employer, as plan 
sponsor, breaches any fiduciary duty under ERISA by amending the plan. But 
a plan fiduciary, in enforcing an existing plan, must abide by the terms of the 
plan as agreed between the employee–participant and the employer–sponsor. 
The expectation of the employee to receive, and of the employer to pay, 
workers’ compensation benefits lurks in the background of that agreement. 
VI. EQUITABLE SOLUTIONS FOR THE WORKER’S QUAGMIRE 
     When Congress passed ERISA, it did so to protect employee benefits.188 
Congress could not have foreseen ERISA’s collateral interference with well-
established employee benefit schemes. But until Congress issues a legislative 
remedy, injured workers must make do with judicial ones. To counter a 
health plan’s action to enforce an equitable lien against a workers’ 
compensation settlement under 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(3), an employee could 
raise several defenses. First, the health plan’s terms should be construed or 
reformed so as not to extend the right of reimbursement to the proceeds of a 
workers’ compensation settlement because the employer itself, not a third 
party, paid the settlement. Second, the health plan should be estopped by the 
terms of the settlement. 
 
 
                                                
184.  29 U.S.C. § 1001(a) (2012). 
185.  2 POMEROY’S EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE § 378, at 41 (Spencer W. Symons ed., 5th ed. 
2002) (emphasis in original). 
186.  The plan sponsor, i.e., the employer, who funds the plan and writes its terms. BLACK’S 
LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019) defines “settlor” as “[s]omeone who makes a settlement of 
property; esp., one who sets up a trust.” 
187.  Muir & Stein, supra note 159, at 478. 
188.  29 U.S.C. § 1001(a) (2012). “The overarching theme of ERISA was to protect 
reasonable employee benefit expectations.” Muir & Stein, supra note 159, at 521. 
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A. Properly Construing the ERISA Plan Agreement 
     When a health plan seeks to enforce its right of reimbursement against a 
participant who has received a third-party settlement, it asks the court for 
“appropriate equitable relief . . . to enforce . . . the terms of the plan.”189 The 
terms of the plan are contained within the plan documents.190 The 
appropriate equitable relief to enforce those terms is indistinguishable from 
an equitable lien by agreement.191 Therefore, the party who seeks 
enforcement of the plan terms may obtain relief to the extent that an 
agreement giving effect to the plan terms exists. 
 1. Enforcement of Contracts in Equity 
     The touchstone of contract interpretation is the intent of the parties—
“equity regards substance rather than form.”192 While the law “holds parties 
strictly and literally” to the exact words of an agreement, the considerations 
of equity in contract enforcement are different than those at law.193 
Reformation of a contract is an ordinary power of equity, which regards 
reformation as a “preparatory step” that “establishes the real contract.”194 In 
order for a court of equity to reform a contract, a party must show either a 
mutual mistake, where the written contract does not reflect the actual 
agreement (the “meeting of the minds”); or a “mistake of one party” along 
with inequitable conduct or fraud of the other parties.195 In equity, a mistake 
means a mental error, induced by a misunderstanding of the truth, but short 
of negligence.196 A mistake may be of fact or of law. A mistake of law can take 
two forms: a party might be ignorant about his existing legal rights but fully 
understand the effect of the transaction at issue, or a party might be correct 
about existing legal rights and be mistaken about the effect upon them of the 
                                                
189.  29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(3) (2012). 
190.  29 U.S.C. § 1102(a)(1) (2012). 
191.  Sereboff v. Mid Atlantic Med. Servs., Inc., 547 U.S. 356, 364 (2006). 
192.  2 POMEROY’S EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE § 378, at 40 (Spencer W. Symons ed., 5th ed. 
2002). 
193.  4 POMEROY’S EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE § 1297 at 857 (Spencer W. Symons ed., 5th ed. 
2002). 
194.  CIGNA Corp. v. Amara, 563 U.S. 421, 441 (2011) (citing 4 POMEROY’S EQUITY 
JURISPRUDENCE § 1375, at 999 (Spencer W. Symons ed., 5th ed. 2002)). 
195.  4 POMEROY’S EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE § 1376, at 1000–01 (Spencer W. Symons ed., 5th 
ed. 2002). 
196.  3 POMEROY’S EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE § 839, at 284–85 (Spencer W. Symons ed., 5th 
ed. 2002). 
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transaction into which he enters.197 A court of equity might hesitate to grant 
relief for a unilateral “pure and simple” mistake of law, but the balance of 
justice inclines toward one who is mistaken when the mistake is accompanied 
by another’s inequitable conduct.198 Such inequitable conduct need not be 
intentionally misleading.199 Equity will not aid a party who knows of 
another’s mistake and does not correct it, or who induces a mistake by 
“misrepresentation, imposition, concealment, undue influence, breach of 
confidence reposed, mental weakness, or surprise.”200 
     In the days of the divided bench, adhesion contracts were not yet well-
recognized. But equity’s treatment of mistakes of law foreshadowed the 
judicial scrutiny applied to agreements wherein one party has little to no 
negotiating power and must conform to the agreement as drafted by the 
stronger party. The contemporary rule is adhesion contracts are enforceable 
unless unconscionable.201 To avoid a contract on grounds of 
unconscionability, a party must show that he lacked a meaningful choice and 
that the terms unreasonably favored the drafting party.202 The comment to 
the UCC unconscionability provision notes that courts have indirectly 
policed unconscionable contracts by adverse construction of language.203 The 
rule of adverse construction, “in dubio contra proferentem (the terms are 
interpreted against the drafting party),” applies to ambiguous terms in a 
contract of adhesion.204 The overarching goal of courts in enforcing adhesion 
contracts is “vindication of the free will of the individual,” in consideration 
of fairness and equity.205 
2. Application to ERISA Plan Reimbursement Language 
     To aid in the task of interpreting reimbursement language, consider this 
sample subrogation and reimbursement language from the Employer’s Guide 
to Self-Insuring Health Benefits: 
Another party may be liable or legally responsible for 
expenses incurred by a covered person for an illness, a 
                                                
197.  3 POMEROY’S EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE § 841, at 288 (Spencer W. Symons ed., 5th ed. 
2002). 
198.  3 POMEROY’S EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE § 847, at 304–05 (Spencer W. Symons ed., 5th 
ed. 2002). 
199.  Id. at 304. 
200.  Id. at 305. 
201.  E.g., Smith, Bucklin & Assocs. v. Sonntag, 83 F.3d 476, 480 (D.C. Cir. 1996). 
202.  Id. 
203.  U.C.C. § 2-302 cmt. 1 (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM’N 1977). 
204.  Bolgár, supra note 156, at 76–77. 
205.  Id. at 78. 
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sickness or a bodily injury. Benefits may also be payable 
under this Plan for such expenses. 
 . . . . 
     By accepting benefits the plan participant agrees the Plan 
shall have an equitable lien on any funds received by the plan 
participant and/or their attorney from any source and said 
funds shall be held in trust until such time as the obligations 
under this provision are fully satisfied. 
. . . . 
     As a condition to participating in and receiving benefits 
under the Plan, the plan participant agrees to assign to the 
plan the right to subrogate and pursue any and all claims. 
The Company may, at its option: 
     • take over the covered person’s right to receive payment 
of the benefits from the third party. 
. . . . 
     • recover from the plan participant any benefits paid 
under the Booklet [SPD] which the plan participant is 
entitled to receive from another party. The company will 
have a first lien upon any recovery, whether by settlement, 
judgment or otherwise, that the covered person receives 
from: (1) the responsible party; (2) the third party’s insurer 
or guarantor; (3) the plan participant’s uninsured or 
underinsured motorist insurance; (4) any first party 
insurance through medical payment coverage, personal 
injury protection, no-fault coverage; (5) worker’s 
compensation; or (6) any other source, including but not 
limited to any school insurance coverage. 
     This lien will be for the amount of benefits paid by the 
Company for the treatment of the illness or bodily injury for 
which the third party is liable or legally responsible. If the 
Covered Person: (1) makes any recovery as set forth in this 
provision; and (2) fails to reimburse the Company fully for 
any benefits paid under this provision; then he will be 
personally liable to the Company to the extent of such 
recovery up to the amount of the first lien. The Covered 
144 LIBERTY UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 14:1 
 
Person must cooperate fully with the Company in asserting 
its right to recover.206 
Although not included within its sample language, the explanation thereof 
recommends that “[t]he plan language should specifically reject the ‘made-
whole rule’ and ‘common-fund doctrine.’”207 Similarly to the plan language 
in McCutchen, this sample language provides an allocation formula 
contradicting the equitable double-recovery rule, which would have given the 
plan participant “first dibs” on the portion of a third-party recovery 
compensating for losses not covered by the plan.208 Here, the plan has a lien 
on “any funds received . . . from any source,” the plan shall recover “any 
benefits paid” out of “any recovery,” and the amount of the lien equals “the 
amount of benefits paid.” 
     The context of the ERISA plan agreement is critical to understanding its 
content. The immediate context is an employment relationship; by 
definition, ERISA only governs plans “maintained by an employer.”209 An 
employer offers health coverage to qualifying employees as an integral part 
of a compensation package: the expense of health benefits is far too great to 
be a mere gratuity. An employee, seeking to avoid incurring the expense of 
maintaining his own health coverage, must take or leave the terms of the plan 
as the employer gives them. An employee’s negotiating power may extend to 
salary amount, the duration of an employment contract, and perhaps even to 
a few other particulars. As far as health coverage, an employee may have a 
choice of insuring either himself or his whole family and might be able to 
select from a menu of deductible or co-insurance options. By no means does 
an employee have the power to pick and choose contract boilerplate terms. A 
reimbursement provision is thus an imposition. 
     The language of most reimbursement provisions invites a mistake of law 
on the part of the contracting employee. In all fifty states, an employee and 
an employer enter their relationship according to the terms of the grand 
bargain of workers’ compensation210 wherein an employee has a right to 
prompt relief for a work-related injury or disease, and an employer is free 
from claims of negligence and accompanying tort damages. This implicit 
agreement constitutes the parties’ existing legal rights before entering the 
                                                
206.  EMPLOYER’S GUIDE TO SELF-INSURING HEALTH BENEFITS ¶ 720 (database updated Mar. 
2016); see also text accompanying notes 91 and 97 for the plan reimbursement language from 
McCutchen and Tackett. 
207.  Id. 
208.  US Airways, Inc. v. McCutchen, 569 U.S. 88, 103 (2013). 
209.  29 U.S.C. § 1002(1) (2012). 
210.  See supra notes 22–33 and accompanying text. 
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health plan agreement. Even if a diligent employee were to read the contract 
boilerplate, he would be mistaken as to the effect the contract would have on 
his existing legal rights. 
     First, in the sample language excerpted above, reimbursement of a health 
plan depends upon another party becoming responsible for expenses 
incurred. This recalls the reimbursement language from McCutchen, which 
referred to the “negligence” or “willful misconduct” of “a third party.”211 Yet 
workers’ compensation benefits are not derived from another party. The 
employer is obligated to pay workers’ compensation benefits, just as the 
employer is the offeror of the health plan to which the employee must adhere. 
     Secondly, the employee might be mistaken as to the extent of the plan’s 
lien. In order to defeat the gist of the double-recovery rule, the language is 
not clear on exactly what funds the plan is entitled to enforce its lien against. 
Though the introductory language says that “[a]nother party may be . . . 
responsible for expenses incurred . . . for an illness, a sickness, or a bodily 
injury,” the plan has a lien on funds “from any source.” The lien is upon “any 
recovery” from five enumerated sources or from “any other source.” Under 
this language, an enterprising plan might pursue a lien against a participant’s 
wages or against an inheritance. Such a right would, of course, be manifestly 
unreasonable. A reasonable interpretation would link “another party[’s]” 
responsibility “for an illness, a sickness, or a bodily injury” with the plan’s 
right to “recover . . . any benefits paid . . . which the plan participant is entitled 
to receive from another party.” Such an interpretation would mirror the 
double-recovery rule, wherein a right of reimbursement only applies to the 
amount of a recovery that compensated for the covered loss. The effect of the 
above-quoted reimbursement provision upon the employee’s existing legal 
rights is that any compensation benefits representing lost wages or future 
medical expenses would be subject to health plan reimbursement, along with 
the portion representing past medical expenses. 
     A court of equity might not reform a contract if a mistake of law is merely 
unilateral, but it would do so if the other party knows of the mistake and does 
not correct it, or induces it by “misrepresentation, imposition, concealment, 
undue influence, breach of confidence reposed, mental weakness, or 
surprise.”212 The sample language above seeks to exclude the made-whole rule 
by defining the amount of the lien as the amount of benefits paid. This 
language suggests a link between the lien and the benefits paid, and thus to 
the portion of the recovered funds representing such benefits. Much clearer 
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language would express the fact that the plan may recover against the 
participant regardless of whether the funds sought were actually 
compensation for the loss that the paid benefits covered. The ambiguity as to 
a third-party recovery and as to the funds that the lien seeks constitutes a 
misrepresentation and concealment of the participant’s rights under the 
agreement. The unsuspecting employee is faced with an unenviable choice: 
either to accept coverage for the basic human need of healthcare at the risk 
of compromising compensation benefits, or to preserve state-mandated 
compensation benefits by rejecting health coverage. This is not a meaningful 
choice. 
     If a court of equity were to reform the plan contract, it must do so with 
regard to the rights of both parties, for “[e]quity suffers not a right to be 
without a remedy.”213 Equity should preserve a right to reimbursement for 
the plan, while recognizing a corresponding right in the participant to retain 
compensation payments made by the employer that represented losses other 
than those which the employer’s health plan covered. 
B. Estopping the Plan from Asserting Its Right to Recovery 
     When an ERISA plan seeks to enforce a lien against a workers’ 
compensation settlement, the participant could argue that the plan should be 
estopped from doing so. As the Supreme Court has noted in an ERISA 
remedies case, estoppel is another traditional equitable remedy, alongside 
contract reformation.214 Equitable estoppel is defined as the preclusion of a 
party, by the party’s own conduct, from asserting rights against another 
person who has relied on such conduct and changed his position so as to 
acquire some corresponding right.215 In equity, satisfaction of the elements of 
fraud is not required for estoppel, though, in a sense, a party’s assertion of 
rights contradicting his former conduct is a fraud upon the rights of the 
person benefitted by the estoppel.216 
     A workers’ compensation settlement often maintains the denial of the 
claim in exchange for the release of the employer’s liability. The terms of the 
settlement may admit that the employer’s health plan has paid medical 
expenses for the employee’s injuries while denying that the settlement 
                                                
213.  CIGNA Corp. v. Amara, 563 U.S. 421, 440 (2011) (quoting R. FRANCIS, MAXIMS OF 
EQUITY 29 (1st Am. ed. 1823)). 
214.  Id. at 441. 
215.  3 POMEROY’S EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE § 804, at 189 (Spencer W. Symons ed., 5th ed. 
2002). 
216.  3 POMEROY’S EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE § 803, at 184–85 (Spencer W. Symons ed., 5th 
ed. 2002). 
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compensates for those injuries. The parties to a settlement make these 
stipulations in order to circumvent state laws prohibiting waiver of statutory 
compensation rights: if a settlement is made for less than the full statutory 
benefits (which, by definition, a settlement is), then that agreement would be 
invalid.217 The employer’s offer of payment, along with stipulations 
preventing the invalidity of the agreement, induces the employee to accept 
the settlement. The employee, in accepting the settlement, changes his 
position because, in releasing the employer from compensation liability, he 
is no longer entitled to full statutory benefits. The employer has satisfied the 
elements of equitable estoppel such that, when seeking to enforce its right of 
reimbursement, the employer’s health plan should be estopped by its 
stipulation in the compensation settlement that the payment did not 
compensate for any injury or medical expenses. 
     An ERISA plan participant and workers’ compensation claimant made an 
estoppel argument in Brantley v. Pepsi Bottling Group, Inc.218 The ERISA-
governed plan was a long-term disability plan rather than a healthcare plan.219 
The participant settled a workers’ compensation claim for about $35,000 to 
be “spread out over his actuarial life.”220 According to the settlement, “the set 
off for . . . disability benefits shall be $72.66 per month.”221 The long-term 
disability plan administrator reduced the payments by $1,000, the full 
amount of payable benefits, in order to offset the workers’ compensation 
settlement in thirty-five months.222 The participant–claimant sued the 
employer and its plan’s administrator under 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(1)(B), 
contending inter alia that the defendants were estopped to renounce the 
settlement’s disability set off limitation.223 The court gave two reasons for 
denying estoppel. First, the plan’s claim administrator was not a party to the 
settlement agreement.224 Second, although the employer was a party to the 
settlement, it was so only in its capacity as employer and not in its ERISA 
fiduciary capacity.225 The court explained that, with respect to an employer’s 
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ERISA plan, the employer has two hats; only when the employer’s actions 
constitute “managing” or “administering” a plan does it wear its ERISA hat.226 
     The Brantley court concluded, without analysis, that the employer was not 
managing or administering the disability plan when it agreed to the workers’ 
compensation settlement. An ERISA fiduciary is statutorily defined as any 
person who exercises any discretionary authority or control over 
management of the plan or its assets.227 Courts distinguish between actions 
that constitute managing or administering a plan and actions that are mere 
business decisions that affect the plan: the decision “to amend or terminate a 
welfare benefits plan” is not a fiduciary one.228 Plan design and termination 
are not fiduciary acts, but the implementation of those decisions are fiduciary 
acts.229 When an employer communicates with employees about plan 
benefits, it acts as a fiduciary; reasonable employees would assume that the 
employer is acting as administrator of the plan.230 Contrary to the Brantley 
court’s conclusion that the employer did not act in a fiduciary role in making 
the compensation settlement, the employer’s agreement regarding a set-off 
limitation for disability benefits could be interpreted as a communication 
about the disability plan’s benefits. Similarly, an employer’s acknowledgment 
in a workers’ compensation settlement of medical benefits paid by its 
healthcare plan, along with its agreement that none of the settlement 
represents medical benefits, might be understood as a discretionary act of 
control over the healthcare plan’s assets. Thus, the employer would be acting 
on behalf of the plan; any other plan administrator, as an alter ego of the 
employer, would be estopped by the employer’s representations. 
     The Brantley case differs in other key respects from a suit by a healthcare 
plan to enforce a reimbursement provision. In Brantley, the participant sued 
the plan and not vice versa. The participant sued under 29 U.S.C. § 
1132(a)(1)(B), which allows a participant “to recover benefits due to him 
under the terms of his plan, to enforce his rights under the terms of the plan, 
or to clarify his rights to future benefits under the terms of the plan.”231 That 
cause of action does not contain the “appropriate equitable relief” language 
of § 1132(a)(3), under which the Supreme Court in Mertens limited relief to 
                                                
226.  Id. (quoting Sengpiel v. B.F. Goodrich Co., 156 F.3d 660, 665 (6th Cir. 1998)). 
227.  29 U.S.C. § 1002(21)(A) (2017). 
228.  Sengpiel v. B.F. Goodrich Co., 156 F.3d 660, 665 (6th Cir. 1998) (citing Sutter v. BASF 
Corp., 964 F.2d 556, 562 (6th Cir. 1992)).  
229.  Dana Muir & Norman Stein, Two Hats, One Head, No Heart: The Anatomy of the 
ERISA Settlor/Fiduciary Distinction, 93 N.C. L. REV. 459, 485 (2015). 
230.  Id. at 489 (discussing Varity Corp. v. Howe, 516 U.S. 489 (1996)). 
231.  29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(1)(B) (2017). 
2020]  PHENOMENAL COSMIC POWERS  149 
 
the categories typically available in equity, and thereby began the line of cases 
conducting a historical equitable analysis.232 When a party brings suit for 
appropriate equitable relief, a court must necessarily ask whether “he who 
comes into equity [has] come with clean hands.”233 
C. The Likelihood of Success of the Participant’s Arguments 
     Given the current state of ERISA law, courts are unlikely to ratify any 
agreement that differs in any respect from the plan documents. Courts have 
inferred reasons for exclusive reliance on plan documents not expressed by 
Congress’s official statement of policy in ERISA. Employers can insert plan 
provisions that make traditional contractual construction impossible. The 
history of ERISA litigation demonstrates an inexorable pattern of deference 
to plan sponsors and administrators. Congress should amend or supersede 
ERISA with legislation that prevents ERISA plans from interfering with 
established employment benefits. 
1. Courts Are Unwilling to Enforce Anything Other Than Plan 
Documents 
     The Supreme Court ratified the equitable power to reform an ERISA plan 
in CIGNA Corp. v. Amara.234 In Amara, however, the power to reform 
extended to enforcing benefits under a prior version of the plan when 
participants had insufficient notice of plan changes.235 Courts have repeatedly 
made written plan terms the be-all-end-all of employment fringe benefits: 
ERISA “is built around reliance on the face of written plan documents.”236 
ERISA requires that “[e]very employee benefit plan shall be established and 
maintained pursuant to a written instrument.”237 That requirement is 
supposed to make employee benefit plans predictable and certain.238 Courts 
infer that Congress’s intent was that plan documents should “exclusively 
govern . . . employers’ obligations.”239 Allowing informal plan amendments 
would disincentivize employers to offer benefits.240 Altering a plan based on 
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communications outside the plan documents “would undermine ERISA.”241 
Strict adherence to plan documents, without examining other expressions of 
the parties’ intent, promotes simple administration.242 If plan administrators 
must look outside the plan documents to determine how to distribute 
benefits, they will become embroiled in disputes and be dragged into court.243 
     Tempering relief according to equitable principles by limiting the reach of 
an ERISA plan’s right of reimbursement does not undermine ERISA. 
Congress specified that its intent in establishing ERISA was to prevent 
employees and their beneficiaries from being “deprived of anticipated 
benefits.”244 Congress specifically excluded workers’ compensation from 
ERISA coverage.245 Although preventing an ERISA plan from obtaining the 
wage-loss portion of workers’ compensation benefits does diminish the sum 
of assets in the plan’s coffer, “[a]ny overpayments received by participants 
typically are small relative to the size of the plan.”246 The marginal effect of 
reducing recovery against workers’ compensation settlements is not a serious 
threat to a plan’s financial integrity. 
     Furthermore, limiting reimbursement in accordance with the parties’ 
intent does not entail the administrative burden that distributing benefits 
according to external agreements would. Distributing benefits is the normal 
course of an administrator’s business and does not necessitate disputes or 
negotiations. When an administrator seeks reimbursement, it is the one 
instigating litigation. It would not be burdensome to follow a bright-line rule 
that only the “past medical expense” portion of benefits are available for 
reimbursement when those benefits are paid by the same employer whose 
plan seeks reimbursement. 
 2. ERISA Plans Are Exempt from Judicial Interpretation 
     Although an ERISA plan is a contract of adhesion, federal courts resist 
construing ERISA plan terms in favor of plan participants.247 The reason 
courts typically interpret contracts de novo is that courts presume both 
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contracting parties acted in self-interest when making the plan.248 In an 
adhesion contract, the adhering party is unable to act in self-interest, thus 
giving rise to the rule of contra proferentem.249 The Supreme Court has 
authorized plan sponsors to include terms giving a plan administrator 
discretionary authority to construe the plan itself.250 This ability, along with 
reservation-of-rights clauses, limits judicial review to an “arbitrary and 
capricious” standard.251 An employer’s “unchecked and unreviewable” ability 
to impose plan terms and interpret plan provisions is inconsistent with 
Congress’s intent in establishing ERISA.252 
     Interpretation of plan provisions at the discretion of the employer 
forecloses any argument that an employee’s understanding of the agreement, 
or his pre-existing legal rights, is relevant to how far a right of reimbursement 
extends under the plan terms. However, when a plan seeks reimbursement 
under 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(3), a court should determine whether an 
agreement exists that supports the plan terms. A court should exercise its 
equitable power to examine the true nature of the agreement. When a plan 
seeks to vindicate its nearly limitless power by obtaining equitable relief, it 
must accept the inherent limitations of the equitable jurisdiction, for “he who 
seeks equity must do equity.”253 
 3. Congress Should Amend or Supersede ERISA 
     Congress’s explicit and implicit purposes in adopting ERISA are mired in 
an array of conflicting judicial decisions.254 Congress should adopt legislation 
protecting the full scope of employee benefits. Congress previously 
attempted to adopt national standards for workers’ compensation law, but 
existing state plans were too entrenched for federal standards to be politically 
expedient.255 Congress should revisit workers’ compensation in order to 
protect compensation benefits from its own interference by the effects of 
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ERISA. The task would not be impossible; for example, the Americans with 
Disability Act prohibits discrimination and supersedes ERISA.256 Congress 
can vindicate its objective of preventing deprivation of employees’ 
anticipated benefits without upsetting the protections that ERISA has 
established. 
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